

Breakout Group Discussions

Theme 1: Efficiency and effectiveness of the Article VI verification regime

- Q1a: Which type of activity do you see as the most inefficient during industry inspections, and how do you think this can be improved?
- Q1b: Inspections at non-inspectable plant sites are often seen as inefficiency in industry inspections. Can you think of any measures or solutions to reduce their occurrence?
- Q2a: Do you think that the current number and distribution of industry inspections, which has been stable since 2014, is appropriate for an effective Article VI regime?
- Q2b: The re-inspection rate for OCPF and Schedule 3 sites is currently random, and it has been observed that some sites have been re-inspected relatively soon. Do you consider the current approach for re-inspections as effective? If not, what could potentially be a more effective approach?
- Q3: Article VI Verification is carried out by on-site inspections. Can you think of other means of verification which can augment the effectiveness of the industry verification regime?



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Theme 2: Cooperation between NAs and the Chemical Industry in awareness raising

- Q1: Considering that risks of re-emergence of chemical weapons exist in the entire value chain of chemicals (the manufacture, transportation, storage and trade), what other stakeholders than the chemical industry and its associations should be more actively engaged? How could they be engaged? What roles could the national chemical industry associations and the National Authorities take to engage them?
- Q2: What are and would be the roles of the national chemical industry associations in ensuring that their members are aware of the CWC and their own obligations towards the Convention, as well as supporting their members in fulfilling the CWC obligations? What are existing good practices, areas to be strengthened and improved? What other practices could be pursued?
- Q3: How could small and medium-sized enterprises are reached out to encourage that their training activities could cover the CWC and OPCW mandates, what they can contribute to the work for the world free of chemical weapons? What are existing good practices, areas to be strengthened and improved? What other practices could be pursued?



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Theme 3: The role of Article VI verification regime in light of emerging threats and chemical terrorism

Q1: The Technical Secretariat is expected to submit options for further assistance it may provide to States parties to enhance chemical security.* Which areas are of particular interest in this regard from the perspective of National Authorities? Which role could the chemical industry play in this context?

Q2: An Executive Council decision addressing the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors** underscored "the obligation of each State Party under paragraph 2 of Article VI of the Convention to "adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used" for purposes not prohibited under the Convention." Which necessary measures are already implemented nationally? Which additional ones would provide the greatest benefit in addressing the threat of CW use? How does/could chemical industry contribute to these necessary measures?

Q3: The Open-Ended Working group on Future Priorities of the OPCW recommends that verification activities should be carried out based on a risk-based approach, in which States Parties' declarations would continue to form the basis for such activities, but factors such as States Parties' technical capacities, advances in science and technology, voluntary measures by relevant stakeholders, and the degree to which effective national implementation measures are in place should be taken into account in prioritising activities.** In the view of National Authorities and chemical industry, what would be the advantages/disadvantages of such a risk-based approach? Which risk assessment tools could be useful in complementing the current approach to Article VI verification? How could a modification of the existing approach help to ease the burden of Article VI inspections?

* Paragraph 21 (b) of C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018

** EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017 in paragraph 4

*** Paragraph 8 of RC-4/WP.1, dated 16 July 2018